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The ART of Life: IVF or Child Adoption?
* 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of child adoption on the utilization of assisted reproductive 
technology (ART) in the US. Using state-level longitudinal data for 1999-2006, we show that 
ART use is responsive to changes in adoption markets. Controlling for state-specific fixed 
effects, the estimated elasticity of ART cycles performed with respect to child adoptions is 
about -0.13 to -0.15. The responsiveness is higher when we consider infant adoptions, 
adoptions by older women, and international adoptions while there is no substitutability 
between ART and adoption of related children. Our findings suggest that public policies 
regarding adoption, including subsidies, influence ART use. 
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Infertility is recognized as a medical condition and is dened as the inability to conceive
after one year of unprotected intercourse. In the US, infertility is a growing problem: over
the last several decades, age-related infertility has become increasingly prevalent as a relatively
larger portion of women have deferred childbearing due to eective birth control methods, safe
and legal abortions, better access to college education, and greater participation in the labor
market (Kane and Staiger, 1996; Angrist and Evans, 1999; Caucutt et al., 2002; Goldin and
Katz, 2002; Buckles, 2008).
For individuals with fertility problems who want to have children, there are two main
alternatives: adoption and infertility treatment.1 Chandra et al. (2005) use data from the 2002
National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) and show that about 57 percent of women who
received infertility treatment also considered or actively sought to adopt a child. Infertility
is an important factor in determining the demand for adoption. Married childless couples
are more likely to seek adoption, and adoption is more prevalent among women who have
used infertility services (Chandra et al., 2005; Bernal et al., 2008). Our calculations using
the 2002 NSFG show that about 33 percent of the women who are currently seeking to adopt
have also sought medical assistance with getting pregnant. The extent to which individuals
view child adoption and infertility treatment as alternatives is an empirical question with
important economic, social, and public health implications. The answer would indicate whether
federal and state adoption policies can signicantly inuence the decision to pursue assisted
reproductive technology (ART).
The motivation for this paper is the recent trend of increasing ART utilization. Since
the beginning of the 1980s, diagnostic and treatment options for infertility have advanced dra-
matically in terms of eectiveness as well as availability. ART now includes several dierent
options which consist of clinical treatment and laboratory procedures such as in vitro fertil-
ization (IVF), gamete intra-fallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intra-fallopian transfer (ZIFT),
embryo cryopreservation, oocyte or embryo donation, and gestational surrogacy. As a result,
Americans have been utilizing more and more ART, mostly in the form of IVF. In 1995, an es-
1Another option is surrogacy if there are no problems with male fertility. This method requires a fertile
surrogate mother to be articially inseminated with sperm who then carries the baby to term. In most states,
there are no laws regarding surrogacy arrangements and in others surrogacy agreements are prohibited altogether.
Moreover, this is an expensive method as the average cost is estimated to range between $70,000 and $130,000 in
2009 (Cohen, 2009). This gure is considerably higher than the cost associated with the other two alternatives
discussed here.
2timated 6.7 million women had impaired fecundity of which 42 percent had received some form
of infertility services (Stephen and Chandra, 2000). In 2002, an estimated 7.3 million women
had fecundity problems and about 45 percent had received some form of medical assistance
(Chandra et al., 2005). The most commonly used infertility services are the non-invasive meth-
ods including medical advice, infertility testing, and ovulation drugs. ART, including IVF, is
utilized by less than one percent of women, but the number of children conceived through ART
is quite high. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports indicate that in
1996, 20,840 babies were conceived using ART; this gure more than doubled by 2006 when it
soared to 54,656 (CDC, 2008).
The number of adoptions, on the other hand, remained relatively at during the same
period. Recently, Bernal et al. (2008) provide descriptive evidence suggesting that the ad-
vancements in ART may be linked to reductions in the demand for domestic infants. They
calculate the ratio of the number of women who delivered their own biological children with
ART to the number of women who adopted unrelated children domestically and show that this
ratio has continuously increased: it was 15 percent in 1992, 34 percent in 1996, and 60 percent
in 2002. According to the US Children's Bureau, about 51,000 children were adopted in 2006.
However, every year thousands of more children wait to be adopted in the US. The estimated
number of children in foster care waiting to be adopted was about 129,000 in 2006 (US DHHS,
2008). The discrepancy between the number of children waiting to be adopted and the number
actually adopted is because the adoptive matching of parents and children requires consider-
able time and resources, and because the demand for adoption remains insucient (Hansen
and Hansen, 2006). A shortage of adoptive parents is a social concern since childhood at foster
care is associated with poor lifetime outcomes (see, for example, Doyle, 2007).
Despite the technological advances, ART remains a risky, complex, and expensive en-
deavor. Such infertility treatments are costly both in terms of money and time. The total cost
of a successful delivery using IVF ranged between $44,000 and $211,940 in 1992 (Neumann
et al., 1994) and the average cost was estimated to be more than $50,000 in 2001 (Collins,
2001). ART may also have signicant adverse health eects on both the mothers and babies,
especially as a result of the increased prevalence of multiple gestations. In particular, triplet
and higher order multiple pregnancies lead to a greater chance of complications such as pre-
maturity and maternal morbidity (Van Voorhis, 2007). Between 1980 and 1997, the number
of annual live born babies from twin gestation rose by 52 percent, while the number of high-
3order multiple gestations increased by 404 percent|these growth rates are mostly attributed
to ART (NCHS, 1999). Bitler (2008) estimates that the additional hospital costs associated
with a national mandate covering infertility treatment would be $334 million in 2000 dollars,
due to the expected increase in the number of twin births alone.
The utilization of ART lends itself to controversies over who should have access to
such technologies, who should pay for the treatments, and whether the practices and providers
should be regulated. Most recently, a mother in California (who already had six young children
conceived through IVF) gave birth to octuplets with the help of IVF. This incident sparked
a discussion on the ethics of ART and whether there should be regulations on how ART is
practiced (Archibold, 2009). Bioethicists who argue in favor of such rules point out that child
adoption and foster care are more strictly regulated compared to infertility treatment (Caplan,
2009). Child adoption, as an alternative to ART, has been discussed in similar debates when
several states, starting in the late 1980s, have enacted health insurance mandates that regulate
coverage for infertility treatment. Currently, 15 states require health insurance plans to provide
some form of coverage for infertility treatment. As pointed out earlier by Neumann (1997),
any policy decision regarding ART has potential implications for child adoption.
A policy relevant question, which we focus on here, is whether legislative changes regard-
ing the adoption of domestic children from foster care might encourage individuals to choose
adoption over ART. Although some individuals might consider adoption as a primary means
to having children, many others might pursue adoption only if they fail to conceive a child bi-
ologically connected to themselves. Even then, changes in the cost of adoption might inuence
individuals' decision regarding how the number of ART cycles to use before they give up on
this option. In general, the point we make in this paper is that these two markets may be
related to one another. In fact, one might expect that there is a stronger link between ART
markets and private adoptions. We focus on foster care adoptions since the use of public policy
tools is a lot more common for encouraging adoptions from foster care.
To answer our question, we use multiple sources of data on child adoption and ART
utilization to construct state-level panel data from 1999 to 2006. Our empirical results indicate
changes in adoption markets signicantly aect ART utilization. The estimates reveal that
a 10 percent increase in child adoptions per 1,000 women would lead to a 1.3 to 1.5 percent
decrease in the number of ART cycles performed per 1,000 women. In our models, we control
for state-specic xed eects (FE) and also address the potential simultaneity bias by using an
4instrumental variables estimation method (FE-2SLS). We also carry out additional analyses
according to the age of the adopted children and of the adoptive mothers and nd that the
substitutability is greater for women aged 35 and older as well as for adoptions of younger
children. Finally, we perform a series of robustness checks. For example, we provide evidence
that the responsiveness is much larger when we consider international adoptions, suggesting
that use of ART is more sensitive to the demand for private adoption. On the other hand, there
does not seem to be a relationship between ART markets and adoptions of related children
from foster care.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a review of the previous
literature and section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 outlines the empirical
framework and presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Literature on Child Adoption
Adoption seems less risky than pursuing ART since individuals typically end up with
a child at the end of the process. In addition, most of the costs of adoption are incurred
at the end, only when the actual adoption process has taken place (Neumann, 1997). Still,
child adoption is a fairly complex, time-consuming, and uncertain process. The cost of child
adoption, beyond the document preparation and legal fees, varies widely depending on the type
of adoption. The US Children's Bureau reports that foster care adoption costs can be as much
as $2,500, domestic infant adoption costs vary between $5,000 and $40,000, and international
adoption costs range from $7,000 to $30,000 (US DHHS, 2004a). Adoptive parents are subject
to extensive background investigations and may face long waiting periods that vary greatly
depending on the child's, the birth parents', and the adoptive parents' circumstances. Moreover,
adoptive parents face risks in terms of the child's t within their family. In light of these factors,
federal and state governments support adoptive parents by oering incentives in the form of
tax credits and tax exclusions, as well as adoption subsidies and reimbursements.2
The impact of public policies on foster care, adoption, and child welfare outcomes have
2The federal adoption tax credit is oered to families adopting a child with special needs from foster care
which was set at $12,150 per child for the 2009 tax year. In addition, some employers provide adoption benets
to their employees, and several agencies make adoption loans and grants available to couples undertaking child
adoption.
5been extensively studied.3 Such policies date back to 1935 Title IV-B of the Social Security Act
(SSA) which \provided federal funding to states for a broad range of preventive and protective
child welfare services for abused and neglected children" (Allen and Bissell, 2004). Next, Title
IV-E of the SSA was introduced with the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
and it established the federal Foster Care and Adoption Assistance Program. Avery (1998)
provides an overview of the Act, its subsequent amendments, and its implementations by the
states. In the early 1980s, following the passage of this Act, there was indeed a decline in the
number of children in foster care (Waldfogel, 2004).
This trend, however, did not last long. Swann and Sylvester (2006) report that foster care
caseloads more than doubled from 1985 to 2000. They attribute 31 percent of this growth in
caseloads to higher female incarcerations during that period. Falling welfare benets account
for another 15 percent of the growth. Similarly, Bitler et al. (2006) report that the welfare
reforms of the 1990s were associated with more children living in foster care. In 1997, President
Bill Clinton signed the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) into law. Besides other changes
in policies, this Act regulated the termination of parental rights (TPR) in an eort to reduce
the likelihood that children stay in foster care for extended periods of time. A child in foster
care cannot be adopted until the date of TPR. The ASFA seems to have reduced the foster care
caseloads by giving states incentives to move children out of foster care and into adoption and
other permanent placements (Swann and Sylvester, 2006). Others have investigated dierent
factors, such as the increased availability of contraception methods and the legalization of
abortion, that have inuenced the supply of adoptable children and eventually the adoption
rates (e.g. Gennetian, 1999; Bitler and Zavodny, 2002; Bernal et al., 2008).
State child welfare agencies oer nancial compensation to adoptive parents in the form
of adoption subsidies which are often nanced by contributions from the federal government.
Such subsidies are claimed to be \the single-most powerful tool used by the child welfare system
to encourage adoption" (Gibbs et al., 2006). Gibbs et al. (2006) and Hansen (2008a) discuss
the wide variation across states in terms of the design of their subsidy programs. Similarly,
Hansen (2007a) shows that the states change the amount of the subsidy in an eort to promote
adoption in the case of special needs children. Special needs criteria are based on the child's
characteristics that typically include age, race, ethnicity, sibling groups, disabilities, among
3Bernal et al. (2008) provide an excellent review of child adoption in the context of institutional background
and historical trends in the US for the period of 1951-2002.
6others; however, each state sets its criteria within broad federal guidelines. Dalberth et al.
(2005) show that the adoption subsidies vary widely with the child's as well as the adoptive
parent's characteristics. Researchers have exploited the variation in adoption subsidies within
states over time to evaluate their impact on adoption outcomes. Using data from the 1996-2003
Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS), Hansen (2007b) shows
that federal and state policies promoting adoption of children from foster care signicantly
increase the demand for adoption. She nds that an increase of $100 in average adoption
assistance payments would have reduced the number of children waiting in foster care by
almost 4,200 per year.
State child welfare agencies also oer nancial compensation to the foster caregiver
families or institutions. These nancial incentives take the form of basic monthly foster care
payments. The average gures indicate that the subsidies compensate foster caregivers about
56 to 77 percent of their monthly expenditures for a 9 to 11 year old child, depending on the
level of family income (Doyle and Peters, 2007). Hence, the subsidies constitute a signicant
portion of the monetary costs associated with childrearing and seem to improve the placement
of foster children (Doyle and Peters, 2007; Duncan and Argys, 2007). It is important to note
that not only is adoption cheaper than foster care (in terms of monthly subsidies), but it might
also yield better outcomes than foster care placement. Barth et al. (2006) perform a careful
comparison of long-term foster care with adoption using propensity score matching method.
They nd that the cost of foster care to the government is on average twice as much as the
cost of adoption.
Doyle (2007) also reports signicant adverse eects of foster care on child outcomes for
school-age children and youth. Using an instrumental variable approach to identify causal
eects of foster care on long-term outcomes, he nds that children in foster care have higher
delinquency rates, higher teen birth rates, and lower earnings. Another cost-benet analysis
carried out by Hansen (2008b) indicates that adoptions provide far greater long-term benets.
Her analysis takes into account a wide range of outcomes including the child's health, behavior,
education, criminal activity, and employment. The estimated total private benets range
between $88,000 and $150,000 while the estimated total public benets are even larger, about
$190,000 to $235,000 in 2000 dollars. Her ndings indicate that, from the public policy point
of view, a dollar spent on adoption from foster care yields about three dollars in benets.
72.2 Literature on ART Utilization
The second strand of literature related to our paper is on the use of ART, evaluating
how the increased availability of treatments inuenced ART utilization, fertility rates, and
other outcomes. Most of these studies exploit the variation in state-level infertility insurance
mandates. Bitler and Schmidt (2006) use pooled waves of the NSFG for the period of 1982-2002.
They report signicant racial, ethnic, and socio-economic disparities in access to infertility
treatment. In particular, white and highly educated women are signicantly more likely to
seek medical treatment to become pregnant. However, they do not nd any evidence that the
mandates increased ART utilization. Schmidt (2007) uses the Vital Statistics Detail Natality
Data (DND) les and the Census to study fertility rates between 1981 and 1999. She nds
that the presence of a mandate increased birth rates among women over age 35 by about 8
percent. She claims that this is the case because older and more educated women not only
having a higher demand for infertility treatment services, but also being more likely to have
private health insurance.
Several other papers conrm that mandated insurance coverage has increased IVF avail-
ability and utilization. Bundorf et al. (2007) use the DND from 1981 to 1999, in conjunction
with the clinic-level utilization data for the period of 1991-2001. They show that the use of
infertility treatments is signicantly greater in states adopting comprehensive versions of infer-
tility insurance mandates. Henne and Bundorf (2008) use the 1990-2001 national clinic registry
data and nd that in states with comprehensive mandates, the increased access to reproductive
therapies led to increased ART utilization rates as well as higher growth rates of utilization.
Finally, Bitler and Schmidt (2009) focus on the eect of mandates on the utilization of treat-
ments by older and more-educated women. Using pooled data from the 1982, 1988, 1995, and
2002 NSFG, they nd that the mandates had a large and signicant eect on utilization of
infertility treatment for exactly this subsample of women without any visible eects for the
entire female population of childbearing age.
Buckles (2007) examines the period of 1982-1999 using the DND along with the March
Current Population Surveys (CPS). She conrms that the infertility insurance mandates in-
creased the incidence of multiple births and the birth rate among older women (ages 35+) while
the birth rates for younger women during the same period declined. In addition to encour-
aging women to delay childbirth, she claims that these mandates may have had far reaching
consequences in the form of impacts on labor force participation, educational attainment, and
8marriage. The estimated eects of increased access to infertility treatments on being married
and a woman's educational attainment are statistically signicant but small. Machado and
Sanz-de-Galdeano (2009) conrm these ndings that the mandates led to delays in rst births
using data from the DND for the period of 1968-2004 and March CPS for the period of 1968-
2008. In addition, they nd that the women in states with insurance mandates have fewer
children by the end of their reproductive lives compared to the women in control states.
Finally, Bitler (2008) analyzes the same data as Schmidt (2007), and focuses not only
on fertility but also on infant health outcomes between 1981 and 1999. She shows that the
insurance mandates led to signicant increases in the number of twin deliveries. As mentioned
previously, multiple gestations may lead to complications for both the babies and the mothers.
She nds that the mandates increased the use of infertility treatment by older women which
in turn lead to small, albeit statistically signicant, negative impacts on health outcomes for
both twins as well as singletons.
None of the studies mentioned above focuses on how adoptions and infertility treatment
utilization might be related. Bernal et al. (2008) acknowledge that the availability of ART
might be partly responsible for the decline in adoption rates, though not until about 1985 since
the rst successful IVF was implemented in 1981. They argue that the eect of ART utilization
on the number of children adopted could be sizeable, but they do not formally estimate this
relationship. To our knowledge, our study is the rst to provide empirical evidence on the links
between ART use and child adoption in the context of public policy.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis uses state-specic longitudinal data from 1999 to 2006. The
main variables of interest are the measures of ART utilization and child adoption. The former
come from the national clinic registry data and were collected as a joint eort by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM), and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART). The adoption gures
are obtained from the AFCARS. The analysis also includes several annual state-specic char-
acteristics which were collected from various sources. The full list of sources and summary
statistics are depicted in Table 1.
93.1 ART Utilization
ART utilization gures were obtained from the CDC's annual ART Reports.4 These
data refer specically to ART procedures in which a physician surgically removes a woman's
eggs, in order to combine them with sperm and then return them to her uterus. Among various
ART techniques, IVF is the most common form. According to the 2006 report, IVF was the
method of choice in 99.7 percent of all types of ART procedures using fresh non-donor eggs
or embryos. Since 1995, each ART clinic that is a member of the SART is required to report
certain indicators regarding its operations and success rates to the CDC as mandated by the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certication Act of 1992. Each year, the CDC publishes
clinic-level data with a three-year lag to track the outcome of the cycles performed.
The ART cycles performed correspond to the year in which they started. The data
include information on the number of cycles performed as well as pregnancy and birth rates by
various age groups. Our key outcome measure is the number of ART cycles performed using
fresh non-donor egg transfers.5 As described in Table 1, this measure displays great variation
across states and years. We normalize this measure (as well as the adoption gures) by the
number of childbearing age women (25-44) in each state by year.6 Specically, the main ART
utilization measure in this paper is the number of ART cycles performed per 1,000 women,
which steadily increased from 1.42 in 1999 to 1.92 in 2006 in our sample.
As part of our empirical analysis, we restrict our attention to women who are ages 35 or
older (35+) since impaired fecundity becomes more pronounced for this age group, well before
the onset of menopause. Moreover, ART is less eective among older women: on average, it
takes less than three ART cycles per one live birth when all women are considered, while about
ve ART cycles are performed per one live birth among older women (35+). We construct
an additional outcome measure for the number of ART cycles performed for women who are
ages 35 or older and adjust this measure by the number of women in the same age group.
This outcome measure rose somewhat faster from 1.40 in 1999 to 1.96 in 2006, with an overall
average of 1.72. Finally, we proxy the \availability of ART procedures," using the number of
4CDC ART Reports are publicly available online at http://www.cdc.gov/ART.
5In 2006, the most commonly performed ART cycles were transfers using fresh non-donor eggs/embryos
(72 percent), followed by frozen non-donor eggs/embryos (16 percent), and lastly fresh and frozen donor
eggs/embryos (eight and four percent, respectively). In our robustness checks, we provide analyses based on
these alternative measures of ART cycles performed.
6Normalizing variables by 1,000 births instead of 1,000 women leaves our results unchanged.
10ART clinics for a given state and year (per 1,000 women).7 On average, there are about 7.5
clinics (or 8.8 per 1,000,000 women), while there is great variation across states and years.
There are a few data limitations that need to be mentioned. First, the CDC ART reports
lack information on individual ART users. As a result, an increase in the number of cycles
performed could be due to an increase in the number of users and/or higher number of trials per
user. However, focusing on the number of ART cycles rather than the number of ART users is
more policy relevant since the cost of utilization depends on the former. Another shortcoming of
the CDC ART reports is the lack of gures on the utilization of infertility treatments other than
ART, such as ovulation stimulating drugs and surgical repair of reproductive organs. Schmidt
(2007) reports that most instances of impaired fecundity are treated by these less invasive
therapies with costs ranging from $200 to $3,000 per treatment. Given the considerably lower
cost of such alternative treatments, individuals with impaired fecundity would presumably
use these kinds of infertility services before considering adoption or ART. Hence, we do not
expect to see any signicant relationship between child adoption and the utilization of infertility
treatments other than ART.
3.2 Adoption and Foster Care
Data on adoption measures come from the AFCARS which is a federal source of child-
specic information on all children covered by the protections of Title IV-B and Title IV-E of
the SSA (NDACAN, 2007). Since 1995, states have been submitting data to the US Children's
Bureau on a semi-annual basis, concerning each child in foster care and each child who has
been adopted under the authority of the state's child welfare agency. The AFCARS database
has been designed to address policy development and program management issues at both the
state and federal levels. It contains one le with the adoption data and another le with the
foster care data for each year.8 The data correspond to the reporting period of federal scal
years, i.e. starting on October 1st and ending on September 30th of the following year.9
The AFCARS has some limitations. First, in the years prior to FY1998, some states
7Since it is not the primary focus of our analysis, the number of ART clinics is treated as exogenously given.
Hamilton and Brian McManus (2007) provide an analysis of the market structure for infertility treatment and
examine the determinants of new ART clinic entry.
8Information on how to obtain permission to use the AFCARS database can be found at
http://www.ndacan.cornell.edu/NDACAN.
9For example, the 2005 data corresponds to October 2004 through September 2005. The 2005 AFCARS
adoption le is then merged with 2005 CDC ART report which corresponds to the 2005 calendar year. Note
that this accords well, since we focus on the eect of adoption on ART utilization as explained in further detail
below.
11did not report any adoption or foster care data and other states have incomplete data. For
this reason, our analysis covers the period from 1999 to 2006 and the panel includes 378
state-year observations.10 Second, the adoption gures reect only the children adopted under
the authority of the state child welfare agency which accounts for about a third of all child
adoptions in the US (US DHHS, 2004b). The process of child adoption takes a variety of
forms as the children could be adopted through private or public agencies and from domestic
or international sources. The AFCARS does not contain gures on international adoptions or
domestic private agency adoptions. Our calculations using the 2007-2008 National Survey of
Adoptive Parents (NSAP) reveal that the share of foster care adoptions is about 37 percent,
while private agency adoptions constitute 38 percent of all adoptions, and the remaining 25
percent are international adoptions. In what follows, we provide descriptive statistics based on
the NSAP and conjecture that our estimates using the AFCARS constitute a lower bound of
the true eect of adoption rates on ART use. In addition, we provide evidence in support of
this argument using data on international adoptions from the Department of State.
Despite its shortcomings, the AFCARS is still the only data source available on adoption
gures along with adoption subsidies that are consistent across states and over time. The
adoption le contains information on adopted children including their gender, race, birth date,
ethnicity, and prior relationship with the adoptive parents. There is also limited information
on the characteristics of the birth and adoptive parents. In this paper, we consider only the
number of child adoptions by unrelated individuals and later provide a robustness exercise
using the number of adoptions by relatives. Based on the number of adoptions of unrelated
children, we form several outcome measures. In addition to considering all unrelated adoptions,
we also decompose this number by the age of the adoptive mother as well as by the age of the
adopted child. The motivation for the subsample of women ages 35 and older (35+) was
explained above. We also study the adopted children who are above age ve (5+) as an
additional subsample. Individuals may pursue ART as a means to having children because
they might have a stronger preference for biologically linked children and also because they
might be particularly interested in raising an infant. If so, adoptions of younger children would
10Mainly due to missing information on adoption subsidies, Nevada and New York are excluded from our
sample together with 14 other state-year observations. The OLS and FE estimations can be carried out using
data on 400 observations. However, the FE-2SLS estimations require information on the number and composition
of the children in foster care waiting to be adopted. To allow for ease of comparison, we report the OLS and
FE results for the sample with 378 observations. The results based on the full sample of 400 observations are
virtually identical to those reported below.
12be considered a more appropriate substitute to ART. We normalize each of these adoption
gures by the number of women (and the number of women 35+), and these child adoption
rates are the primary explanatory variables of interest in our empirical analysis.
The average number of unrelated children adopted in our sample is 711. The average
gure for children adopted by older adoptive mothers (35+) is 562, constituting almost 80
percent of all adoptions. The normalized gures indicate that, on average, there is one child
adopted per 1,000 women (aged 25-44). When we consider the adoptions by older women only,
on average, there are 1.5 child adoptions per 1,000 women (aged 35-44). These gures suggest
that adoptions are more popular among older individuals who are more likely to suer from
impaired fecundity and for whom ART is a relatively more costly and less successful alternative.
During the period we consider, children adopted under the age of ve constitute 43 percent of
all adoptions.
An important piece of information contained in the AFCARS adoption le is the adoption
subsidies provided to the adoptive parents under adoption assistance agreements. Under such
agreements, adoptive parents may receive monthly payments, medical coverage, and other
services depending on the state and county policies if they adopt a child who meets certain
eligibility requirements. According to the US Department of Health and Human Services, 89
percent of all children adopted during FY2006 received adoption subsidies (US DHHS, 2008).
Most of these subsidies are federally funded under Title IV-E of the SSA. In addition, state
and/or county funded subsidies might be available even if an adoption does not qualify for the
Title IV-E subsidies. Using the AFCARS gures, which reect the subsidies eective at the
time the adoption is nalized, we construct average monthly adoption subsidies (in real 2000
US$100s).11 The average monthly adoption subsidy in our sample is about $470. Note that
the adoptive parents continue to receive these subsidies typically until the child reaches age 18.
Thus, they could be sensitive to even small variations in adoption subsidies.
The foster care le of the AFCARS contains information on children in foster care
including their gender, birth date, race, ethnicity, and availability for adoption. As can be
seen in Table 1, the average number of children in foster care is much higher than the average
number of adoptions: only about six percent of children at foster care end up being adopted.
This is partly due to the fact that it is not straightforward to match the children in foster
11Following Dalberth, Gibbs, and Berkman (2005), we set the monthly subsidy amount to missing in the few
cases when they were reported as greater than $10,000.
13care with adoptive families. Another important reason is that not all children in foster care
are considered adoptable as many of them are kept to be reunited with their biological parents
and are thus not available for adoption. We construct a measure of the \supply of adoptable
children" using the number of children in foster care waiting to be adopted. This measure is
also adjusted by the number of women in a given state and year. We use the gender and age
composition of these children as additional identifying variables. As Hansen (2007b, p.382)
points out, the matching of adoptable children and adoptive parents depends on \attributes of
both the adult population and the population of waiting children." Therefore, the composition
of adoptable children may be an important factor if adoptive parents seek specic attributes
when considering to adopt a child.
3.3 State-Level Characteristics
In all of our analyses, we include a number of state-level characteristics to account for the
demographic and economic conditions that could be related to child adoptions as well as ART
utilization. The 2000 Census gures indicate that adoptive children, compared to biological
children, are more likely to live with white, married couples with higher educational attainment,
home ownership rates, and household income (Kreider, 2003). Similarly, women who utilize
infertility treatment have on average higher income and educational attainment, are more likely
to be white and to have health insurance coverage compared to the rest of the infertile women
(Stephen and Chandra, 2000; Bitler and Schmidt, 2006; Farley Ordovensky Staniec and Webb,
2007; Hammoud et al., 2009). Given that the state xed eects remove any unobservable time-
invariant state-specic factors, the eects of all these state-specic characteristics are solely
identied via within-state variation over time.
The state-level variables in our analysis include the number of ART clinics per 1,000
women; the share of the total resident population covered by private health insurance; real
income per capita; the percentage share of the total resident population with at least a college
degree; the teen birth rate; the race ratio of the resident population (dened as blacks over
whites); and the ratio of female resident population between the ages of 35-44 to those between
the ages of 25-44. This last variable indicates the portion of the females with deteriorated
fecundity among women of childbearing age. Female labor force participation rates play a
crucial role in determining the demand for children and thus are included as an additional
explanatory variable.
14We also include a dummy variable that equals one if the state has adopted health insurance
mandates for infertility treatments. Such mandates provide an exogenous source of variation
in the out-of-pocket cost of ART procedures, but most of the states have passed the mandates
in earlier years. During this period, only Louisiana and New Jersey passed mandates, both
in 2001. Due to this reason, it is not possible to carry out an alternative analysis of how
infertility insurance mandates inuence adoption rates. Note that this type of an empirical
work would identify a dierent policy parameter, i.e. how policies regarding health insurance
coverage or regulations in the ART markets aect child adoption rates. We, on the other hand,
are interested in identifying how public policies through child welfare programs inuence ART
users who marginally prefer ART to child adoption.
4 Empirical Framework and Results
4.1 Empirical Framework
To conceptualize our estimation equations, we rst present a simple framework. Suppose
that women of childbearing age in a given state and year are distributed according to a joint
distribution of four variables, U0, Ub, Ut, and Ua. Let U0 denote the indirect utility of a
woman when she remains without a(n additional) child and let Ub, Ut, and Ua denote the
expected utility when she attempts to have an additional child through natural birth, ART,
and adoption, respectively. Next, we dene the following probabilities:
0 = Pr(U0 > Ub;U0 > Ut;U0 > Ua)
b = Pr(Ub > U0;Ub > Ut;Ub > Ua)
t = Pr(Ut > U0;Ut > Ub;Ut > Ua)
a = Pr(Ua > U0;Ua > Ub;Ua > Ut)
Each probability, j, represents the proportion of women who choose option j.12 Conse-
quently, tN is the number of women who choose to use ART to have a child, where N is the
total number of childbearing age women in a given state and year. One empirical implication
of this set-up is that a simple cross-sectional relationship between ART utilization (t) and
adoption (a) might be spurious if the other two probabilities, 0 and b, are omitted from the





Ub<U0 f(U0;Ub;Ut;Ua)dUbdUtdUadU0, where f denotes the joint distribution.
15analysis. For example, if there is an increasing trend of childless marriages, this alone will lead
to a positive correlation between t and a.
Now suppose that there is an increase in the adoption subsidy (or any exogenous shock)
that makes adoption more attractive compared to other options, holding everything else con-
stant. Let s > 0 denote the corresponding increase in Ua. It is dicult to think of any plausible
scenario in which such a change would have an impact on ART utilization rates except through
their eect on child adoptions. Therefore, there is no reason for Uj, j 6= a, to change. The
probabilities after the new adoption subsidy can be expressed as follows:
0
0 = 0   Pr(U0 > Ub;U0 > Ut;Ua < U0 < Ua + s)
0
b = b   Pr(Ub > U0;Ub > Ut;Ua < Ub < Ua + s)
0
t = t   Pr(Ut > U0;Ut > Ub;Ua < Ut < Ua + s)
0
a = a + (0   0
0) + (b   0
b) + (t   0
t)
There are some women who start to seek adoption, ((0   0
0) + (b   0
b) + (t   0
t))N,
where (t 0
t)N represents those who switch from ART to adoption. Thus, the following term




0) + (b   0
b) + (t   0
t)g=a
; (1)
The numerator above indicates the percentage change in the number of women who use ART,
while the denominator represents the percentage change in the number of women who decide
to adopt as a result of the policy.13 This term, which can be interpreted as an elasticity, is
what we aim to identify.
The existence of a measurable mass of (t   0
t)N requires that there are at least some
women who do not have lexicographic preferences, and therefore, may be willing to switch
between ART and adoption in response to policy changes. Our calculations using the 2002
NSFG suggest that there might be signicant overlaps in the population of women who seek
medical assistance with getting pregnant and those women who adopt an unrelated child. The
former are more likely to be infertile (29 compared to 23 percent), white (83 versus 78 percent),
and college educated (79 compared to 66 percent). However, there are no statistically signicant
13We assume that in both ART and adoption markets the equilibrium quantity is determined by the demand.
16dierences in terms of age (36 compared to 38), labor force participation (76 compared to 74
percent), or full-time work status (47 percent for both).
Whether there are some women who switch from ART to adoption is an empirical
question. To test this, we specify the following equation determining ART utilization:
ARTs;t = Adopts;t + Xs;t + 1;t + 1;s + s;t; (2)
where the dependent variable is the number of ART cycles undertaken in state s and year
t, normalized by 1,000 women aged 25-44. Adopts;t is the number of unrelated adoptions
in state s in year t, which is also normalized. Our main interest is the estimate of  which
quanties the average elasticity of ART cycles performed with respect to adoptions. The vector
X includes various state characteristics as listed above that may impact ART use. Equation
(2) also includes year xed eects (1;t) and state xed eects (1;s). The former capture any
nationwide trend in infertility treatment utilization, while the latter pick up any unobserved
time-invariant state heterogeneity. Lastly, s;t is a standard error term.
An econometric problem here, as our conceptual framework indicated, is the potential
endogeneity of Adopt because child adoption and ART utilization are related choices. For
example, if there is an unobservable trend towards smaller families, then the unobservables will
be negatively correlated with both ART use and child adoptions. Under this or a number of
other plausible scenarios, we conjecture that a regression of ART use on adoption rates might
bias the estimated elasticity upwardly towards zero, underestimating how much individuals
might substitute ART use for adoptions. As Doyle and Peters (2007) point out, this problem
may be resolved to a degree with the inclusion of state and year xed eects. However,
to better address the potential endogeneity issue, we also use a xed eects two-stage least
squares method (FE-2SLS). Specically, we estimate the following rst-stage equation:
Adopts;t = 1Subsidys;t + 2KidsWaits;t + 3PercGirlss;t
+4PercInfantss;t + Xs;t + 2;t + 2;s + "s;t; (3)
where the adoption rate is formally modeled as a function of adoption policy and foster care
variables in addition to state xed eects (2;s), year xed eects (2;t), and state characteristics
that are included in the second-stage equation.
The instrumental variables are selected based on previous ndings. The literature on
17child adoption reviewed above has documented that the adoption rate signicantly depends
on the number of adoptable children (Gennetian, 1999; Bitler and Zavodny, 2002; Bernal et
al., 2008) and the policy variables that inuence the cost of adoption, including the adoption
subsidies (Doyle and Peters, 2007; Duncan and Argys, 2007; Hansen, 2007b). We include
four instrumental variables (IVs): Subsidy, KidsWait, PercGirls, and PercInfants. There
is substantial variation in average monthly adoption subsidies within states over time since
states can dene their criteria for special needs. In addition, Hansen and Pollack (2005) show
that the subsidy payments typically result from a bargaining process between the child welfare
authority and the adoptive family. Thus, subsidies vary due to variation in the characteristics
of children waiting to be adopted, too. For robustness, we also use an alternative measure: the
basic adoption assistance rates for 2-year-olds as previously utilized by Hansen (2007b). These
basic rates are utilized as benchmark amounts in the bargaining processes and the data are
collected by the North American Council on Adoptable Children (NACAC). The AFCARS, on
the other hand, contains the actual rates eective at the time of adoption nalization and thus
display greater variation.14
While KidsWait indicates the number of children in foster care waiting to be adopted,
PercGirls and PercInfants reect the demographic composition of these children, all mea-
sured at the end of previous scal year. The last two variables are dened as the percentage
of girls and percentage of children under age ve who are in foster care waiting to be adopted,
respectively. The number of children waiting to be adopted (KidsWait) represents the supply.
Given that there is an excess supply of children waiting for adoption, one may expect that
an increase in KidsWait would not necessarily aect the number of children nally adopted.
However, a higher number of adoptable children improves the matching quality between chil-
dren and adoptive parents and, as a result, increases the number of adoptions. Moreover,
the number of children waiting to be adopted might directly or indirectly aect the mone-
tary or non-monetary costs of adoption as well as the decision processes regarding casegoal
determination for the foster care children. In addition to the denition of special needs and the
determination of monthly subsidy rates, Bower and Laws (2002) identify a dozen of other policy
tools that are used by the states to support adoptive parents. These include, but are not lim-
14In our sample, a substantial portion of the variation in adoption subsidies is due to within state variations
over time. The average monthly adoption subsidy is 4.73 with an overall standard deviation of 1.43. The between
states standard deviation is 1.27 and the within states standard deviation is 0.66. The average basic adoption
assistance rate (also measured in constant 2000 $100s) is 3.81 with an overall standard deviation of 1.19. The
between states standard deviation is 1.11 and the within states standard deviation is 0.44.
18ited to, various practices such as non-recurring adoption expense reimbursements, subsidized
guardianships, subsidies for children over 18 years old, eligibility for Medicaid. Such variables
are omitted from our analysis due to absence of state-specic data, but they are partially and
indirectly captured by KidsWait.
The inclusion of the two demographic composition measures, PercGirls and PercInfants,
is also motivated by the literature on \revealed preferences " for adopted children. First, it
has been documented that girls are more likely to be adopted than boys (Kreider, 2003). The
main reason for this is because adoptive mothers prefer girls over boys and because girls seem
less risky to adopt (Groze, 1991; Chandra et al., 1999; Gravois, 2004). Accordingly, we would
expect PercGirls to increase the adoption rate. Likewise, to the extent that adoptive parents
prefer infants over older children, PercInfants is expected to be positively related to adoption
rates.15
The assumption is that our instruments do not directly aect ART use after controlling
for various state characteristics as well as year and state xed eects. It might be plausible that
states determine monetary incentives, such as adoption subsidies, according to the number of
children waiting in foster care or the number of children adopted. However, many researchers
have defended the assumption of exogeneity, especially in the presence of state and year xed
eects (e.g. Hansen and Hansen, 2006; Doyle and Peters, 2007; Hansen, 2007b). Doyle and
Peters (2007, p.343) argue that the subsidy rates are not set to clear the foster care market and
state that they may rather be \set to partially reimburse foster parents for child expenditures
and are often tied to rates set in other welfare programs."
Regarding the validity of KidsWait, one might consider the possibility that higher ART
utilization rates could reduce adoption rates which, in turn, increase the number of children
available for adoption. However, the suggested mechanism indicates a positive correlation be-
tween unobservables and ART utilization rates as well as with KidsWait, which implies that
our FE estimate will be a lower bound of the true substitution eect in absolute terms. Fur-
thermore, note that KidsWait, PercGirls, and PercInfants are all based on the foster care
les which reect the stock values at the end of each scal year, i.e., the number of children
remaining in foster care as of September 30th, whereas adoption gures are ow variables re-
ecting the number of children who were adopted throughout the entire scal year. Therefore,
15We also tried including a measure of the racial composition for the foster children waiting to be adopted
as an additional IV but this variable was never statistically signicant.
19adoption variables are merged with foster care variables for the previous scal year. For exam-
ple, 2005 adoption variables (corresponding to the period of October 2004 to September 2005)
are merged with 2004 foster care variables (corresponding to the period of October 2003 to
September 2004). The timing of these measures further support the validity of our IVs. Below,
we present the results of formal diagnostic tests for the relevance and the exogeneity of the
excluded instruments.
All equations are estimated using the total number of women as weights to reect
underlying microdata. In addition, standard errors are clustered by state in order to account for
possible serial correlation in the error terms. We interpret our FE-2SLS estimates in the spirit
of the local average treatment eect. The FE-2SLS estimate identies the average response
of individuals whose decision is inuenced by the specic instrumental variables used in the
analysis (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). In our case, the FE-2SLS estimate can be interpreted as
the eect of one additional adopted child on the ART utilization for individuals whose decision
to have children is inuenced by the excluded IVs we utilize. These variables include public
policy measures such as adoption subsidies. Therefore, even if these individuals might not be
representative of the entire population, they represent the group whose infertility treatment
utilization is responsive to public policies in terms of child adoption.
4.2 Estimation Results
In Table 2, we present the FE estimation results corresponding to equation (2) as well as
the OLS results. Panel A displays the results for all unrelated adoptions, panel B for unrelated
adoptions by older women (ages 35+), and panel C for unrelated adoptions of older children
(ages 5+). Each column corresponds to a dierent specication: in column 1, the estimation
method is OLS with control variables and year xed eects, but no state xed eects. Column
2 features the same specication as column 1 except that it includes state xed eects. For
brevity, the estimated coecients on state and year xed eects, as well as on the control
variables are not reported.16 We focus on the estimated coecient of our main interest, b .
We report the coecient estimate for the adoption variable followed by its standard error in
parentheses and the implied elasticity in italics.
First, let us focus on the results for all unrelated adoptions and ART utilization in panel
A of Table 2. The OLS model without state xed eects (column 1) yields a positive coecient
16The full set of results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
20on child adoptions that is only marginally statistically signicant (p < 0:10). Including state
xed eects (column 2) yields a negative coecient of about -0.22 which is highly signicant
(p < 0:01). The implied elasticity of ART use with respect to unrelated adoptions is about
-0.13. A comparison between columns 1 and 2 reveals a pattern that is consistent with our
conjecture that a cross-sectional correlation between adoption and ART utilization is likely to
be spurious due to omitted variables related to 0 or b. The FE estimate suggests that there
is substitutability between these two options for having children.
Panel B in Table 2 presents the results for unrelated adoptions by older adoptive mothers
(ages 35+). The implied elasticity of ART use with respect to adoptions (-0.17) is somewhat
larger in absolute terms compared to the results presented in panel A. A higher responsiveness
among older women is expected because ART success rates are lower for them. Since older
women need to utilize more cycles for a successful delivery, an increase in adoptions will reduce
the ART use more compared to younger women. Alternatively, older women might display
weaker preference for biological children. The estimate in panel B is also statistically signicant
(p < 0:01). The nal panel in Table 2 reports the results for the adoptions of older children
(ages 5+). The FE estimate is about -0.30 (p < 0:01) and yields an implied elasticity of -0.10.
This suggests a greater substitutability between ART use and infant adoption, likely reecting
strong preferences for infants among those who undertake ART.
Next, we present the ndings from the FE-2SLS models. Table 3 displays the results
for the rst-stage equation (3). The odd numbered columns refer to the results using the IV
set I (includes average monthly adoption subsidies from the AFCARS) while the even num-
bered columns report the results using the IV set II (includes basic adoption assistance rates
for 2-year-olds from the NACAC). The rst two columns present the results of our baseline
specication based on all unrelated child adoptions. The results are consistent with our ex-
pectations: increases in the average amount of subsidies and the number of waiting children
both signicantly increase adoption rates. Our point estimates suggest that a $100 increase in
adoption subsidies would increase the unrelated adoption rate by 0.03 to 0.07, depending on
the specication. The implied elasticity is about 0.14 to 0.29. These estimates are similar to
those of Hansen (2007b) who estimated an elasticity of 0.16. We also nd that the adoption
rates rise as PercGirls increases, indicating a preference for girls over boys. Finally, the adop-
tion rates among older women (35+) as well as the adoption rates of older children (5+) both
21increase as PercInfants decreases.17 The instruments are all statistically signicant, and the
F-statistic for the joint signicance ranges between 17 and 21. Based on Hansen's J statistics,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of over-identication.
Table 4 displays the results for our second-stage regressions. In panel A, we start with
all unrelated adoptions. Recall that the FE estimate reported in Table 2 is about -0.22. The
FE-2SLS estimates of  in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 indicate even larger eect sizes about
-0.26 and -0.25, respectively, and both are highly statistically signicant (p < 0:01). This
pattern again implies that there are unobserved factors that are correlated with both ART and
Adopt in the same direction, such that the FE estimate is biased toward zero. The implied
elasticity of ART utilization with respect to unrelated adoptions is -0.15|slightly larger in
absolute terms. In panel B, we restrict our attention to older adoptive mothers (35+). The
estimated coecients are associated with somewhat larger elasticity gures in absolute terms,
between -0.18 and -0.19. Finally, panel C displays the results for older adopted children (5+);
the estimated elasticities are about -0.11. Thus, once again, the adoption of older children
seems to be a relatively weaker substitute for ART use.
There are some other ndings worth noting, namely those regarding control variables
included in the analysis (not reported). First, we nd that one additional infertility specialty
clinic per 1,000 women increases the number of cycles performed by about 66 per 1,000 women
(p < 0:01). Second, the infertility insurance mandates increase ART utilization rates, but the
eect is statistically insignicant possibly due to limited within-state variation. Third, the use
of ART increases in per capita income (p < 0:05), which likely reects the fact that a major
obstacle to ART is the nancial cost. Fourth, higher teen birth rates seem to signicantly reduce
ART utilization (p < 0:01), which might be picking up the eect of economic conditions and/or
private agency adoptions on ART use. Lastly, ART utilization is also positively associated with
the proportion of female resident population between the ages of 35-44 to those between the
ages of 25-44 (p < 0:01). As explained before, this fraction represents the relative size of the
female population experiencing relatively more severe fertility problems among all women of
childbearing age.
17Note that to interpret the reported elasticities on these two variables one should consider a one unit change
which implies a doubling of the variable given that they are expressed as fractions rather than percentages.
224.3 Robustness Checks
Table 5 presents the results of separate robustness checks using FE models. First, we run
a regression including both related and unrelated child adoptions. Related adoptions are quite
dierent in nature than unrelated adoptions since the former are probably undertaken mostly
due to motives independent of fertility status and economic factors (e.g., people adopting
young ospring of their siblings or spouses). This exercise yields basically zero coecient
and elasticity estimates for related adoptions, while the coecient on unrelated adoptions is
virtually the same as reported above (panel A).
As discussed above, the AFCARS gures reect foster care adoptions only, not all
child adoptions. Our calculations using the NSAP reveals that foster care adoptions make
up little more than a third of all adoptions. Those who adopt from foster care might be
dierent than those who pursue international or private agency adoptions. In fact, the summary
statistics using NSAP suggest that foster care adopters are less auent compared to the rest,
based on the level of their household income. Second, foster care adopters are less likely to
suer from infertility. About 38 percent of the foster care adopters report infertility, while
the corresponding share is 52 and 72 percent for private agency and international adopters,
respectively. Therefore, foster care adopters might be less likely to pursue ART suggesting
again that our estimates would constitute lower bounds of the true eect of child adoption on
ART use.
To test this conjecture, we obtained data on international adoptions from the Oce
of Children's Issues under the US Department of State. These data include the number of
all children who received immigrant visas issued during a given scal year for the purpose of
adoption in the US. On average, there were 0.5 international adoptions per 1,000 women during
our period of analysis (see Table 1). Panel B in Table 5 reports the estimation results when we
include international adoptions in addition to unrelated foster care adoptions as explanatory
variables. The FE regressions of ART use yields a coecient of -0.761 on international adoptions
(p < 0:05). The coecient on unrelated foster care adoptions remains the same as before
(p < 0:01). The estimated elasticity on international adoptions is -0.22, indicating that changes
in international adoptions have larger eects on ART use compared to domestic adoptions from
foster care.
As a nal exercise, we consider all ART cycles using non-donor and donor egg/embryo
transfers including both fresh and frozen types. Inclusion of frozen non-donor embryo transfers
23together with the fresh non-donor ones does not aect the results (panel C). The coecient
estimate is still highly statistically signicant and the implied elasticity is about -0.13. On the
other hand, the regression using donor egg/embryo transfers (both fresh and frozen) reveals
a negative but statistically insignicant coecient estimate (panel D). This nding can be
interpreted as evidence for no substitutability between adoptions and ART cycles performed
using donor eggs/embryos only. This is rst because such cycles are a small portion (12 percent)
of all ART cycles performed. Second, they are presumably more costly due to even higher price
tags as well as the additional diculties associated with nding a donor.
5 Conclusions
The empirical evidence we present suggests that promoting adoption encourages some
individuals to adopt rather than pursuing ART as a means to having children. While ART
provides the individuals with the possibility of having children who are biologically linked to
themselves, concerns have been voiced about how demanding these types of treatments are,
not only nancially but also physically and psychologically, considering the low odds of success.
Given the high costs of keeping children in foster care, both in terms of the social services costs
and the adverse long-term outcomes for the children involved, it might be socially desirable to
implement policies in an eort to encourage child adoption. In addition, the regulations on child
adoption and ART utilization need to be reviewed to level the playing eld since adoptions
are subject to relatively tougher restrictions. The issue of ART use lends itself to several
controversial questions concerning who should have access to such technologies, who should
pay for the treatments, and whether the providers should be regulated. These considerations
need to be addressed given that ART not only impact women's birth and health outcomes, but
also potentially their marriage, education, and career decisions.
Recently, Congress passed the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions
Act of 2008. This legislation, among other things, allows for revisions in the adoption incentive
programs including the Title IV-E adoption assistance. Our ndings suggest that such changes
in adoption and foster care policies may have signicant long-term eects on child adoption
rates and also on the utilization of ART. Similarly, changes in the infertility treatment mar-
kets may have signicant consequences in terms of child adoption. Since the early 1980s, the
availability of treatment options for infertility has been greatly expanded mainly due to rapid
24technological change and also due to some states enacting legislation regarding infertility treat-
ment insurance. Currently, the House of Representatives is evaluating the Family Building Act,
which proposes to expand the coverage for infertility treatment to those who work for rms
that self-insure. In Europe, ART is being considered as a possible tool to increase fertility
rates in an eort to mitigate the consequences of population ageing (Grant et al., 2006). In
the future, new technological advances and increased competition among infertility clinics are
expected to continue reducing the cost of ART and increasing utilization. The insights oered
here suggest that such changes in ART markets may have unintended consequences on child
adoption outcomes.
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30Mean St. Dev.
Child Adoption & Foster Care
1
Adoptions 711 885
Adoptions per 1,000 women aged 25-44 0.994 0.524
Adoptions by adoptive mothers 35+ 562 725
Adoptions by adoptive mothers 35+ per 1,000 women aged 35-44 1.456 0.807
Adoptions of children 5+ 408 515
Adoptions of children 5+ per 1,000 women aged 25-44 0.588 0.351
Average monthly adoption subsidy ($100)
2 4.728 1.428
Average monthly basic adoption assistance rate for 2-year-olds ($100)
2, 3 3.812 1.191
Children in foster care 12,374 19,328
Children in foster care waiting to be adopted 2,380 2,841
Children in foster care waiting to be adopted per 1,000 women aged 25-44 3.262 1.816
Children in foster care waiting to be adopted per 1,000 women aged 35-44 6.106 3.647
Percentage of girls in foster care waiting to be adopted 0.466 0.048
Percentage of children 0-4 in foster care waiting to be adopted 0.291 0.073
Related adoptions 214 532
Related adoptions per 1,000 women aged 25-44 0.259 0.275
International adoptions
4 366 343




ART clinics 7.503 10.089
ART clinics per 1,000 women aged 25-44 0.009 0.006
ART clinics per 1,000 women aged 35-44 0.017 0.013
ART cycles performed 1,477 2,083
ART cycles performed per 1,000 women aged 25-44 1.743 1.778
ART cycles performed for women 35+ 789 1,252
ART cycles performed for women 35+ per 1,000 women aged 35-44 1.723 2.247
ART cycles performed using non-donor eggs (fresh & frozen) 1,747 2,447
ART cycles performed using non-donor eggs (fresh & frozen) per 1,000 women aged 25-44 2.045 1.997
ART cycles performed using donor eggs (fresh & frozen) 225 407
ART cycles performed using donor eggs (fresh & frozen) per 1,000 women aged 25-44 0.223 0.198
State Characteristics
Total number of women between ages 25-44
6 801,357 920,363
Total number of women between ages 35-44
6 426,134 480,674
Health insurance mandate on infertility treatment
7 0.280 0.450
Percentage of resident population under age 65 with private health insurance coverage
8 0.721 0.063
Income per capita ($1,000)
2, 8 29.306 4.828




Female labor force participation rate
8 0.612 0.042
Teen birth rate (births to teenage mothers under age 20 as a percent of total births)
11 0.111 0.028
Ratio of female resident population between ages 35-44 to those between ages 25-44
6 0.535 0.026
Bureau.  
7Bitler (2007) and Schmidt (2007).  
8Current Population Surveys.  
9U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
10National Center for
5CDC ART Reports.  Figures reflect ART cycles performed using fresh non-donor eggs only unless specified otherwise.  
6US Census
Health Statistics.  
11National Vital Statistics Reports.
Table 1: Summary statistics (N=378 unless indicated otherwise)
Notes: 
1AFCARS Adoption and Foster Care Files.  Figures reflect unrelated child adoptions unless indicated otherwise.  
2All figures
are expressed in constant 2000 US$.  
3North American Council on Adoptable Children, NACAC (N=373).  
4US Department of State.(1) (2)
(A) 














Estimation method OLS FE
Year fixed effects Yes Yes




include state and year fixed effects as well as the following controls: number of ART clinics (per 1,000 women), indicator for health insurance mandate on infertility
women and standard errors are clustered by state.  R-squared values in column (2) are calculated without taking the contribution of the state fixed-effects into account.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
treatment,  percentage covered by private health insurance, real income per capita, percentage with at least a college degree, percentage black, teen birth rate, female
labor force participation rate, and ratio of female resident population between ages 35-44 to those between ages 25-44.  Estimates are weighted using total number of
Table 2: OLS and FE regression results, 1999-2006
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed (per 1,000 women)
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed for women 35+ (per 1,000 women)
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed (per 1,000 women)
Notes: For each regression, we report the estimated coefficient followed by estimated standard error in parentheses and implied elasticity in italics.  All specificationsIV set I IV set II IV set I IV set II IV set I IV set II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average monthly adoption subsidy ($100) 0.0430** 0.0675** 0.0358**
(0.0209) (0.0321) (0.0138)
0.2045 0.2192 0.2881
Average monthly basic adoption assistance rate 0.0353* 0.0619* 0.0281**
           for 2-year-olds ($100) (0.0203) (0.0328) (0.0129)
0.1375 0.1650 0.1853
Number of children in foster care waiting 0.1929*** 0.1939*** 0.1644*** 0.1648*** 0.1503*** 0.1520***
           to be adopted (per 1,000 women) (0.0359) (0.0363) (0.0315) (0.0321) (0.0270) (0.0273)
0.6432 0.6349 0.7022 0.6918 0.8482 0.8424
% girls in foster care waiting to be adopted 1.6628*** 1.7318*** 2.9271*** 3.0680*** 1.4305*** 1.5065***
(0.2980) (0.3394) (0.4383) (0.5017) (0.2162) (0.2325)
0.7921 0.8225 0.9542 0.9972 1.1534 1.2111
% children 0-4 in foster care waiting to be adopted -0.6429 -0.7865* -1.4089** -1.6628** -0.8698*** -0.9980***
(0.3958) (0.4169) (0.6009) (0.6247) (0.2655) (0.2704)
-0.1914 -0.2324 -0.2871 -0.3363 -0.4384 -0.4992
Observations 378 373 378 373 378 373
States 49 49 49 49 49 49
R-squared 0.6373 0.6363 0.6507 0.6521 0.6885 0.6923
F-statistics for the excluded instruments 19.04 17.37 20.61 19.82 17.80 19.46
Overidentification test of all excluded instruments 0.4045 0.2816 0.4417 0.2760 0.4090 0.2847
           (p-value for the Hansen J statistic)
include state and year fixed effects as well as all the following controls: number of ART clinics (per 1,000 women), indicator for health insurance mandate on infertility treatment,
percentage covered by private health insurance, real income per capita, percentage with at least a college degree, percentage black, teen birth rate, female labor force participation
rate, and ratio of female resident population between ages 35-44 to those between ages 25-44.  Estimates are weighted using total number of women and standard errors are
clustered by state.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Adoptive mothers 35+
Notes: For each explanatory variable, we report the estimated coefficient followed by estimated standard error in parentheses and implied elasticities in italics.  All specifications
Table 3: First stage regression results, 1999-2006
Adoptions Adopted children 5+
Dependent variable: Dependent variable: Dependent variable:(1) (2)
(A) 














Estimation method FE 2SLS (IV set I) FE 2SLS (IV set II)
Observations 378 373
States 49 49
(per 1,000 women), indicator for health insurance mandate on infertility treatment,  percentage covered by private health insurance,
and ratio of female resident population between ages 35-44 to those between ages 25-44.   IV set I and II are presented in Table 3.
R-squared values are calculated without taking the contribution of the state.  Estimates are weighted using total number of women
and standard errors are clustered by state.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
real income per capita, percentage with at least a college degree, percentage black, teen birth rate, female labor force participation rate, 
Table 4: FE 2SLS regression results, 1999-2006
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed (per 1,000 women)
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed for women 35+ (per 1,000 women)
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed (per 1,000 women)
Notes: For each regression, we report the estimated coefficient followed by estimated standard error in parentheses and implied
elasticity in italics.  All specifications include state and year fixed effects as well as all the following controls: number of ART clinics(A) 
Unrelated adoptions (per 1,000 women) -0.2188***
        (0.0750)
-0.1248







Unrelated foster care adoptions (per 1,000 women) -0.2178***
        (0.0732)
-0.1243




















the state fixed-effects into account.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
real income per capita, percentage with at least a college degree, percentage black, teen birth rate, female labor force participation
rate, and ratio of female resident population between ages 35-44 to those between ages 25-44.  Estimates are weighted using total
number of women and standard errors are clustered by state.  R-squared values are calculated without taking the contribution of
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed using fresh & frozen donor eggs (per 1,000 women)
(per 1,000 women), indicator for health insurance mandate on infertility treatment,  percentage covered by private health insurance,
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed (per 1,000 women)
Table 5: Robustness checks using FE models, 1999-2006
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed (per 1,000 women)
Dependent variable: ART cycles performed using fresh & frozen non-donor eggs (per 1,000 women)
Notes: For each regression, we report the estimated coefficient followed by estimated standard error in parentheses and implied 
elasticity in italics.  All specifications include state and year fixed effects as well as the following controls: number of ART clinics